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Crises of war-to-peace transition and civil war recurrences: A focus 








This chapter advances two interconnected arguments. First, a process-based approach 
to leadership is essential to building and sustaining peace in African conflicts. 
Leadership building must precede and become the anchor for institution building in 
places where the idea of building and sustaining democratic institutions is yet to 
become embedded in daily practice. Ambitions of democratic consolidation in such 
places without evidence of organic leadership processes are tantamount to “building 
castles in the air”. Second, and by extension, the starting point for any war-to-peace 
transition plan is a return to the state building conversations that preceded armed 
conflict in the affected society. This in itself requires an effective leadership process. 
A large number of Africa’s armed conflicts are a result of fragmented state making 
processes.  
 
There is a deliberate focus in this chapter on process-based leadership as an entry 
point for a discussion of war-to-peace transitions. There is no universally accepted 
definition of leadership. But there are clearly identified perspectives that guide 
leadership theory and practice. Popular notions of leadership are overwhelmingly 
leader-focused. Much emphasis is placed on individuals at the top of vertical 
hierarchies. As such, too great an expectation is often placed on these individuals to 
transform situations and improve the human condition. The discussion in this chapter 
departs radically from this popular perspective. Making sense of war-to-peace 
transitions in Africa requires altering this perspective to a process-based one, which is 
discussed in greater detail later. Process-based approach to leadership resides in the 
very interaction between leaders and followers in their response to mutual situations.  
 
Two key themes, among others, underline discourses on war-to-peace transitions 
today. First is the problem of conflict relapse. Studies undertaken in the last decade 
and subsequently built upon, find that armed conflict is likely to re-ignite in more than 
40 per cent of conflict situations where peace was previously negotiated (Lacina and 
Gleditsch 2005; Walter 2011). Ten years later, this trend has hardly changed. In 2015, 
about half of the conflict-related issues on the agenda of the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council are to do with situations of conflict relapse (UN AGE 2015). Second 
and related, is the approach to the transitions following armed conflict geared toward 
moving war-affected societies toward “normal” peaceful conditions.  
 
Much debate surrounds the dominant approach and template for building and 
sustaining peace. This state building approach underpinned by a liberal peace 
paradigm is much criticised for its failure to deliver stable peace in many situations of 
armed conflict (Chandler 1999; Duffield 2001). Its most visible impact is basic 
security and the language of human rights (Richmond 2009a). The argument for 
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liberal peacebuilding is clear and consistent: building post-conflict states into liberal 
democracies and liberal market economies offers a better chance for sustainable peace 
Duffield 2001; Paris 2004). Critics decry the approach for its neglect of local 
interests, actors as well as processes and the resulting negation of local agency (Pugh, 
Cooper and Turner 2011; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). At the same time critics 
are challenged for not offering clear and workable alternatives to liberal 
peacebuilding (Paris 2010).  
 
Paris’ (2004) own proposal for institution building rather than rapid liberalisation – 
which makes the building of liberal democratic states and market economies 
unattainable – does not reject liberal peacebuilding. Rather it offers a halfway point 
toward liberalisation. If attention were focused on the building of viable institutions 
and on legislative and policy reforms, post-conflict states would eventually be in a 
position to internalise liberal peace. In any case, institution building has been at the 
core of state building efforts in the last two decades. Over time, a generic template has 
become apparent in post-conflict contexts regardless of the local dynamics. Typically, 
a peace agreement is followed by a period of transition often characterised by power-
sharing arrangements among feuding elite. Policy and constitutional reforms would 
normally occur within this brief transition window. So would any number of national 
dialogue or consultative processes. This period ends with the holding of democratic 
elections (UN AGE 2015).  
 
Neither of the two approaches – liberalisation or institution building – is the direct 
focus of the discussion of war-to-peace transitions in this chapter. But they are not 
entirely out of the frame of discussion. Rather than ask familiar questions as to 
whether liberal peace can effectively address conflict relapse this chapter looks to 
other realms to understand some of the challenges of war-to-peace transitions. Part of 
the challenge in dealing with conflict relapse is that little is offered in academic and 
policy literature by way of viable alternatives to dominant approaches to building 
peace. That is not say that such alternatives or options do not exist particularly in 
situations that do not attract international responses. Some studies have argued for a 
closer examination of conflicts that are amenable to home grown approaches, away 
from the gaze of the international community – as is the case, for example, with non-
state armed conflicts (Kifle Ababu 2015). This chapter therefore seeks to shed light 
on several issues treated as outliers in war-to-peace transitions.     
 
This chapter suggests that factors beyond those of the dominant state building 
narrative and the accompanying template account for the elusiveness of sustainable 
peace in Africa. It thus looks to several places for alternative narratives. One is the 
approach to leadership in peace processes. Another is the very nature of the post-
colonial state in Africa, and its seeming disconnect from the larger society. This is a 
subject that occupied the attention of post-independence political scientists in Africa 
as will be shown later. Situations of armed conflict are in many cases the result of 
lingering issues connected to the post-colonial state. Such conflicts also present an 
opportunity to revisit and transform the particular conflict affected states to meet the 
demands of citizens. Superimposing state building templates without interrogating the 
very nature of the state in relation to the society from which it emerges only delays 
the inevitable – a return to conflict. For many African states that were not the result of 
the expression of the will of their peoples, it is arguable that without a return to the 
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conversations that led to armed conflict, a generic state building approach is unlikely 
to succeed (Olonisakin and Muteru 2014).  
 
In the sections that follow, this chapter provides a rationale for a process-based 
approach to leadership in these transitional societies and examines what opportunities 
exist to revisit state building conversations in certain post-conflict contexts. The 
extent to which negotiated settlements leave room for a return to the state making 
issues that led to war is worth investigating. The door might be slammed shut in 
conflict situations that end in victory for one party and defeat for other(s) since the 
basis for negotiation or mediation is removed by the inevitability of victory. 
Arguably, negotiated settlements have the potential to transform the targeted post-
colonial state into one that shapes the collective destinies of leaders and peoples.  
  
 
Why the approach to leadership matters in war-to-peace transitions 
 
War-to-peace transitions are invariably a product of the peace settlements that precede 
them. Their success is dependent on approaches to the prevailing structural conditions 
under which armed conflict occurred in the first instance. While the model of 
transitions is not the central focus of the discussion here, the extent to which these 
two factors are taken into account is an important issue under investigation. Situations 
in which wars have ended in outright victory are becoming less the norm. Even so, in 
such contexts such as Ethiopia (from 1991) and Rwanda (from 1994), much is left to 
the victors’ will and vision of a post-conflict society. Overwhelming attention is 
focused on conflicts that end through negotiated settlements and the templates of war 
to peace transitions in this context. Understandably, negotiated settlements offer 
opportunities to revisit the root causes of conflict; and to transform the context for 
sustainable peace. However, a discussion of root causes and of the opportunities for 
transformation invariably draws attention to the gaps in current approaches to conflict 
in Africa.  
 
The trends in Africa’s war-to-peace transitions suggest that there is limited success 
not least because they are products of “imported peace” agendas and “elite peace” 
arrangements. In conflicts that have been amenable to negotiated settlements in Africa 
(as in other places) war-to-peace transitions share a common narrative. Interventions 
and the transitions that follow are modelled on the logic of liberal peacebuilding 
referred to at the beginning of this chapter. It is assumed that building strong 
democratic states and institutions will secure lasting peace. As such, much 
peacebuilding policy and practice have focused overwhelmingly on the weakness of 
democratic institutions in African states. There is no corresponding interrogation and 
facilitation of an organic process through which strong institutions might be built. 
This is in part the challenge to which critics of liberal peacebuilding refer. The 
question of whether the whole of society is involved in a conversation about the terms 
on which people will live together is often missing. More importantly, discussions 
about whether, and how people and their leaders share a sense of mutual purpose and 
pursue a common national vision, is often missing from key discourses on 
peacebuilding in Africa. 
 
The institution-building agenda is in itself not faulty. The idea that strong and 
effective institutions will regulate political and administrative behaviour is well 
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founded. By implication, any conversation about leadership is contained within the 
process of institution building in transitional societies. When leadership is narrowly 
construed – focusing largely on individuals in positions of authority – it is reasonable 
to expect the performance of these individuals to be regulated by institutional 
practice. However, in the African conflict-affected contexts under focus, where strong 
and effective democratic institutions are in large part non-existent, the process of 
bringing such institutions into being becomes a central issue at the core of the 
transition. Strong institutions arguably promote effective leadership. Where there are 
no strong institutions, effective leadership becomes a prerequisite for building 
effective institutions. The context that frames that leadership and how effectiveness is 
derived is another matter, altogether.  
 
There are therefore, two central issues, which, arguably, ought to be at the core of the 
state building agenda but which are often missing – leadership building and attention 
to the structural roots of conflict. Leadership building here refers to the sustaining of 
interaction between leaders and a broad cross-section of the population in seeking 
solutions to their common situation. Invariably, inordinate attention is devoted to 
building particular types of institutions that are superimposed without priority 
attention to the pillars upon which those institutions must rest. These are the 
conditions that underline the conflict as well as the leadership dynamics in the target 
societies. Leadership thus serves as an important entry point for building the core 
values and systems that will produce and sustain institutions in Africa’s post-conflict 
society. In the absence of strong institutions, governance processes in African 
societies become more reliant on the content and quality of leaders and leadership 
than is the case in other places where governance institutions have been reproduced 
consistently over many generations (Rotberg 2007:17).  
 
Classical peacebuilding discourse and its associated policy and practice rarely tackle 
leadership outside of the institution-building approach. To be certain, peacebuilding 
approaches deal with leadership related issues albeit it narrowly. However, the 
absence of a deliberate and systematic focus on leadership in the agenda-setting phase 
of transitions underscores the primacy accorded institution building. It is taken for 
granted that institutions will invariably shape the leadership dynamics in the post-
conflict environment. Indeed, leadership tends to come into focus well into the 
transition through lower level programmatic interventions such as those undertaken, 
for example, by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The focus is 
typically on capacity development for individual or aspiring leaders. The treatment of 
leadership from this individual perspective is limiting for any post-conflict transition 
agenda. The assumption that individual leaders can be regulated within an 
institutional framework misses the point of war-to-peace transition. It is about those 
leaders as well as their entire society’s vision of peace. As such, thinking about 
leadership must look beyond persons who occupy formal positions of authority. 
Rather it should take as a starting point the situations that confront society at a given 
moment, for which other leaders might emerge with effective response.                 
 
How must we understand and employ the notion of leadership in war-to-peace 
transitions?  
 
Introducing leadership to a discussion of peace and conflict is fraught with several 
challenges not least because of its complexity. This complexity stems from a range of 
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inter-related factors. First, there is no universally agreed definition; leadership means 
different things to different people across a variety of contexts. Second, it is a subject 
on which expertise is easily assumed by almost anyone. Everyday world is filled with 
practical interpretations and demonstrations of leadership. Third, popular literature on 
leadership is just as abundant and more readily accessible than scientific literature on 
leadership. As such, narrowly focused, popular ideas of leadership tend to be more 
influential in everyday usage and practice even among professional communities. 
Peacebuilding policy and practice is not exempt from this. Popular constructs of 
leadership focus almost exclusively on individuals at the top of vertical hierarchies. 
Much emphasis is also placed on personality of leaders regardless of the situation at 
hand. When this popular framing is applied to the range of challenges discussed in 
this chapter, this perspective is faulty at best.  
 
If leadership is to make a positive difference in war-to-peace transitions, the 
perspective from which the notion is applied is of particular importance. 
Notwithstanding the absence of a universally accepted definition, there is consensus 
in leadership literature on the core perspectives and components of leadership (Grint 
2010; Northouse 2010; Pierce and Newstrom 2010). Grint, for example, unveils the 
four alternative definitions of leadership, which help capture the complexity of 
leadership while focusing the mind on four perspectives from which to view 
leadership (Grint 2010: 4): leadership as position – where leaders operate; leadership 
as person – who leaders are; leadership as result – what leaders achieve; and 
leadership as process – how leaders get things done. 
 
As indicated earlier, popular approaches focus on the first two perspectives of 
leadership – as position and as person. Thus, judgement about what constitutes 
leadership is very much leader centric. They are about the individuals who occupy 
positions of authority. And very often, societal expectations of peace, health, 
prosperity and stability are placed squarely on the shoulders of these individuals. Such 
an approach absolves all other members of society of responsibility for their 
collective goals. Invariably, the leaders upon whom such expectations are placed are 
doomed to failure. The challenges of peacetime societies cannot be addressed through 
the wisdom of a few individuals at the top of societal echelon, let alone the critical 
problems of post-conflict societies. To be sure, the person and position perspectives 
have a place. They are valuable entry points in organised structures focused on single 
inter-related issues such as business or indeed military and security organisations. 
They also have a place in the process of leadership discussed below. But these 
perspectives not do well as the first layer of response to wider societal crisis where, as 
aptly captured by Grint (2010) and Heifetz and Linsky (2002), the problems are not 
just complex ones for which technical solutions will suffice, but wicked problems, 
which require responses outside of the ordinary and the technical.   
 
The challenges of war-affected societies often fall within the realm of wicked 
problems. Serious questions surround the dominant approaches to building peace and 
stability in these societies, which require measures beyond the traditional 
mechanisms. The absence of stable peace as evidenced by the recurrence of violent 
conflict in the same places where heavy peacebuilding investments were previously 
made suggests the need for new approaches and perspectives. These situations call for 
a shift in approaches to leadership – from simplistic adaptation of popular notions – to 
careful attention to organic leadership processes emanating from those contexts 
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(Olonisakin 2014). Approaching leadership as position or as person, for example, 
does not harness such organic processes in the absence of which huge expectations 
are placed on the representatives of peacemaking organisations present in those 
contexts. Could one reasonably expect, for example, that a Force Commander at the 
helm of the military component of a peace operation, or a Special Representative of 
the UN Secretary-General who leads UN’s presence in a target country, no matter 
how charismatic they are, can single handedly deliver peace and stability? The 
positions they occupy or their personal qualities cannot achieve the transformation 
required for sustainable peace.  
 
Results-based leadership also offers an attraction in conflict-affected settings. The 
benchmarks set for post-conflict societies are eminently sensible because they help 
map progress along the path to the desired peace. In Sierra Leone, for example, such 
benchmarks were an important part of the transition from peacekeeping to 
peacebuilding in the peace consolidation phase (Olonisakin 2008). Such results might 
include, for example, constitution drafting, elections, withdrawal of peacekeeping 
troops, emergence of a new national army, and functioning justice mechanisms and 
judicial institutions among many others. However, achieving these results may not 
lead to sustainable peace if the process through which they were realised is inherently 
faulty. Conflict relapse is a more likely scenario if the results achieved do not reflect 
the mutual needs and interests of the protagonists and the rest of society.  
 
Thus, it is arguable that approaching leadership as process is more helpful than the 
other perspectives, in terms of addressing the unending questions about the 
persistence of conflict; the failure to address deep-seated roots of armed conflict; and 
failure to transform the issues involved in conflict so that peace can be sustained for 
development (Olonisakin 2015). The traits of the individual leader do not serve to 
address this question. The leader’s position within an organization or country does not 
go far enough to explain the gaps. It now remains to be seen, what key elements and 
factors underpin process-based leadership, particularly in transitional contexts. 
   
 
What does process based leadership entail in the context of war-to-peace 
transition? 
 
Four inter-related factors underline process-based leadership. The first is mutuality – 
the idea that the situation at hand is mutually experienced – between leaders and the 
populations that they claim to represent. In such circumstances, there is a collective 
feeling that we are all in this together. The experience of conflict, the feeling of 
relative loss and human suffering, as well as the vision of a future without untold 
violence is shared. This mutuality is what produces a context in which leaders and 
followers (i.e. the larger conflict-affected population) respond to their mutual 
situation. In this regard, leadership focuses on common goals and both leaders and 
followers pursue the “common good” (Rost 1991).  
 
The second is the interactive nature of process-based leadership. It is distinctive from 
person-based and position-based leadership in several ways. It is not a trait that is 
integral to the leader. It is not a linear one-way activity but an interactive one. Rather, 
it is “a transactional event, that occurs between leaders and followers… it is not 
restricted to the formally designated leader in the group” (Northouse 2010). In a 
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process-based approach, leadership is to be found in the very interaction between 
leaders and followers in their mutual situation. In this regard, leadership is available 
to everyone and not just people in positions of authority. 
 
A third feature of process-based leadership is influence. According to Northouse 
(2010), “influence is the sine qua non of leadership”. Without influence, there is no 
leader. An individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal 
(Northhouse 2010). Perhaps more significantly, influence is a two-way process. An 
exchange of influence occurs between leaders and the led. When the person in the role 
of leader fulfills the collective goals and expectations, followers reciprocate this in the 
form of esteem, status and heightened influence (Pierce and Newstrom 2010). As 
leaders offer ideas for the pursuit of common goals, followers in turn make demands 
on the leader. Leaders’ ability to respond to followers’ demands sustains this social 
exchange as well as the leaders’ legitimacy (Fiedler 1996).    
 
Fourth and last, reinforcing the three factors above, context matters in leadership. 
Given their rapidly changing nature, conflict and post-conflict contexts draw attention 
to the dynamism of leadership. Effectiveness of interventions in these contexts 
requires process-based leadership. The entry point for the exercise of leadership is the 
“situation” confronting a given population and not individuals in positions of 
authority. Pierce and Newstrom aptly articulate Albert Murphy’s original thinking in 
his 1941 seminal piece: 
 
… situations in which people find themselves create needs, and it is the nature of these 
demands that serves to define the type of leadership needed and thus who will lead … 
Murphy views leadership as a function of the interaction between the person and the 
situation, where the situation consists of the follower(s) and the context confronting 
them. (Pierce and Newstrom 2008: 4) 
 
All of this reinforces the interactive nature of the leadership process. It illustrates 
this interaction in the pathway between leader emergence and succession. The 
leadership process determines who the leader is based on who a group or 
population deems best suited to accomplish their common goals in a specific 
situation. (Pierce and Newstrom 2008: 4). It also determines the future needs of the 
group and who becomes the next leader of the group. According to Murphy, 
situations make leaders; leaders rise and fall as situations change (Murphy 1941). 
 
What implications does this approach to leadership therefore have for dealing with 
contexts of war-to-peace transitions? Process-based leadership requires that war-
affected populations hold a common vision of a post-conflict future with emergent 
leaders. More often than not, emergent leaders in that context are former war-leaders 
and protagonists. Thus the extent to which the terms of peace settlements and 
subsequent transitions reflect this mutuality determines whether stable peace can be 
realised. Mutuality in this regard implies an interactive process between leaders and 
people in responding to their collective situation. As such, an exchange of influence 
would occur between these leaders and the wider society and not just a narrow 
constituency of actors. Wider society in this regard refers to a broad cross-section of 





What can we learn from leadership dynamics in situations of war-to-peace 
transitions in Africa?  
 
In seeking to understand the approach to leadership in a number of transitional 
contexts, several questions are worth considering. The first concerns the vision that 
shaped the post-conflict future. A cursory look at some conflict contexts in Africa 
where wars ended through negotiated settlements reveals several trends. First, in the 
conflict situations in Sierra Leone, Liberia (which spanned several phases across a 14-
year period), Cote d’Ivoire and Sudan, the interventions, settlements and initial post-
conflict transitions were initiated and managed largely by external actors. The 
external conveners changed in some cases but were typically, regional organisations 
(ECOWAS, African Union) and the United Nations. External interveners along with 
the protagonists designed the blueprint for the future on behalf of the post-conflict 
society, with varying degrees of participation by the larger war-affected population. 
Rarely is the vision of the post-conflict future shaped by the society along with their 
local leaders – in essence the war elite. Indeed, overwhelming focus is often placed on 
these prominent individuals, many of who were warlords and bearers of arms.   
 
A second question, which arises from the first, is where and how the exchange of 
influence is occurring in these contexts. Typically, leadership is framed between 
external interveners and local elite. Influence is essentially exchanged between the 
local elite and the international elite – mostly representatives of inter-governmental 
institutions mandated to manage the crisis. A pattern is also observable, in which 
influence is exchanged between other international actors (including, for example, 
international civil society organisations) and segments of the population, typically, 
local civil society elite. Indeed, mutuality is rarely held between local elite and a 
broad cross-section of the local population. The exchange of influence is often 
narrowly focused on a small group in the population.  
 
Third, on what therefore is the success of the transition hinged in such situations? To 
be sure, all of these situations enjoyed periods of success in response to the 
interventions albeit that this was short lived in all instances. Sierra Leone is one of the 
few exceptions. It has successfully experienced a change of government and crossed 
Licklidier (1995) and others’ ten-year conflict relapse barrier. South Sudan is dealing 
with its first relapse (as a new State) while others are still in various stages of post-
conflict transition. The initial stages of post-conflict transitions in contexts of 
negotiated settlements necessarily rely on the goodwill of external actors and to 
varying degrees this generates a measure of stability initially. In many cases, 
intervening organisations and their representatives fill the leadership gap in war-
affected societies with positive and negative outcomes. In the prevailing situation of 
instability and untold human suffering which precedes transitions, intervening actors 
often possess the power to meet the immediate needs of the local population. The 
basis of their power lies in the capacity, for example, of peace forces to stop mass 
violence, of humanitarian agencies to provide much needed aid; and of international 
NGOs to provide basis services. Thus, there is a direct exchange of influence between 
local conflict-affected populations and external interveners.  
 
This situation changes rapidly. The temporary stability provided by external actors 
shifts the attention of war-affected populations toward the protagonists upon whom 
expectation is placed for the creation of conditions for stability such as disarmament 
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and reconciliation. There is also expectation that the external interveners – the 
peacemakers – will facilitate such an end state. In this situation, the credibility of 
peacemakers is crucial to the successful delivery of a plan for sustainable peace. They 
occupy the leadership space in the absence of a mutually held vision of the future 
between the protagonists and the wider society. However, the end result of many 
peace processes is that this role is often not smoothly relinquished. In convening 
society toward a peace settlement, which among other things would provide a vision 
of the future, much attention is invariably accorded warring parties to the exclusion of 
the majority of the war-affected population. The resulting peace plan is often framed 
around the expectations of the feuding leaders. Ultimately, influence is exchanged not 
between these leaders and the population, but between the external actors and the new 
warring elite. Not surprisingly external actors typically fill the leadership vacuum by 
exchanging influence consistently with warring leaders but only scantily with the 
population. 
 
A moment of opportunity is thus missed to transform the context in favour of the 
collective expectations of that society. By the time external actors and their various 
agents vacate the space, the leaders and the institutions they preside over are 
separated from much of society. In the absence of mutually held vision between 
population and the ruling elite, alternative leadership processes are easily framed 
outside of the leaders of the state and their international allies. As such, there are often 
alternative centres of power over which the state has no control. This is the inevitable 
outcome of a peace effort that does not secure the collective interest and common 
vision of people and leaders. To be certain, all peace plans have elements that address 
aspects of the needs and expectations of the population. The issue is the extent to 
which they deal with deep-seated concerns of the society through a collective process 
in a way that prevents a recurrence of armed conflict.  
 
Fourth and last, in what ways can the leadership dynamics in these contexts be 
transformed to increase the chances for stable peace? What is typically missing from 
the transition planning? There is rarely a discussion of history and the fractured state 
making process that led to war. As a result, there is no collective conversation about 
root causes and how to address these in future structures of governance. Therefore the 
super-imposition of liberal democratic institutions provides no more than a shaky 
foundation. Interveners miss an opportunity to sustain a process of state making that 
addresses historical concerns at the root of broken nationhood, which led to war.  A 
return to the state building conversations of the past is therefore one missing element 
of war-to-peace transitions. It is this issue that forms the focus of the last section of 
this chapter.  
 
 
Revisiting the post-colonial state in Africa 
 
The nature of the post-colonial state in Africa remains a lingering issue, which comes 
to the fore with situations of persistent armed conflict. These situations raise questions 
about the capacity of the state to mediate the differences in society and to manage 
competing interests and needs before they become the basis for larger violence. Many 
African countries have plodded along with their inherited colonial institutions, 
adapting to changing circumstances and societal demands over time. Others have not 
been so successful as their states and societies have been caught in cycles of violent 
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conflict relapse. Many African states were birthed into a Cold War environment, 
which to a large extent prevented them from confronting major early tests of their 
viability. With the protective umbrella of East-West rivalry, and despite claims of 
non-alignment, many African states enjoyed the protection of a great power ally. The 
end of the Cold War removed this protective veil. In the absence of superpower 
protection, the hollow nature of many African states was laid bare. The armed 
conflicts that erupted in the aftermath of the Cold War in Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, and Democratic Republic of the Congo are cases in point.  
 
Four decades after Peter Ekeh’s path breaking work on colonialism and the two 
publics his central thesis remains relevant to the present challenge confronting 
African states, particularly those affected by armed conflict (Ekeh 1975). Ekeh 
analysed “two public realms in post-colonial Africa with different types of moral 
linkages to the private realm” (Ekeh 1975: 92). He argued that one of these public 
realms, which he described as the primordial public, is driven by the same moral 
compulsions as the private realm. However, the other, the civic public, with all its 
connections to colonial systems of administration, “is amoral and lacks the 
generalised moral imperatives operative in the private realm and in the primordial 
public” (Ekeh 1975: 92). Without adaptation to the social context in which they were 
to operate, colonially inherited institutions – including civil service, police and armed 
forces among others – presided over by Africa’s new governing elite, were super 
imposed on African societies. In the absence of sustained conversations between the 
new African elite and the peoples about the terms on which they would live together, 
African states and societies have trudged along, adjusting to the realities of their 
existence. However, today, as in forty years ago, too many state institutions in Africa 
remain distant from large portions of the population.  
 
Many civil conflicts in Africa are in part a result of fractured state making although 
the immediate triggers of conflict do not always lay bare their structural causes. 
Notwithstanding the negative consequences of armed conflict, they provide an 
opportunity to revisit the state making issues, which led to war in the first instance. 
However, the externally produced state building formula intended to build lasting 
peace in many conflict situations is too generic and unimaginative. Failure to consider 
state building within the organic processes in each conflict context invariably leads to 
a relapse. It does not hold the promise of building a common national vision between 
leaders and war-affected populations. Indeed, in many cases, the inability of the state 
to obtain the loyalty of the vast majority of its citizens accounts for much relapsing 
conflict in Africa.  
 
Ekeh’s argument about the colonially inherited civic public’s disconnection from the 
private realm and larger society remains valid today even if that relationship has 
mutated significantly. The distance of that civic public today is in large part a function 
of the disconnection of the ruling elite from vast numbers of the populations that they 
serve. For too long, governing elite exercised leadership based on the positions they 
occupy at the top of vertical hierarchies, treating select state institutions as though 
they were their personal properties (Luckham 1998). Many African states thus remain 
hollow in the absence of deep connection to their affiliate societies. The investment 
made during war-to-peace transitions in the building of democratic states often does 
not yield expected dividend. In many cases, the structures of the liberal state do not 
typically extend beyond capital cities (Richmond 2009b). As such, the façade of a 
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state is easily maintained through membership of inter-governmental structures and 
multilateral institutions. But in reality, in many cases, the populations, which ought to 
be the best expression of a state’s legitimate presence, are far removed from the state 
and its institutions.   
 
 
Lessons from two war-to-peace transitions in Africa 
 
Recent situations of conflict relapse as well as war-to-peace transitions that remain on 
course illustrate the challenge of the postcolonial state even if in differing ways. They 
also lay bare the leadership challenges discussed earlier. Two questions are explored 
in relation to these transitions. First, to what extent do war-to-peace transitions 
address the willingness and ability of leaders to build institutions that are underpinned 
by a shared national vision between them and the populations they claim to represent? 
Second and related, to what extent are leadership perspectives altered from those of 
person and position, which tend to dominate settlement conversations? In recent 
situations of conflict relapse in Central African Republic, South Sudan and more 
recently Burundi, for example, it has been difficult to establish a sense of shared 
destiny between the governing elite at the helm of the state and a broad cross-section 
of society. However, for the purposes of the discussion here, the contrasting 
experiences of Liberia and South Sudan are the immediate focus. 
 
At first sight, Liberia and South Sudan present two contrasting situations but there are 
some similarities in their transition experiences. Liberia did not experience European 
style colonisation like other African States (Ethiopia being the only other exception in 
Africa). A Declaration of Independence in 1847 by its governing elite consisting of 
settlers – freed slaves from the North of the United States of America – propelled the 
state of Liberia into the world of nation-states. However, its state making process was 
fraught with a range of challenges not least generations of socio-economic and 
political exclusion of indigenous Liberians under successive settler dominated 
regimes (Sawyer 1992). Liberia slid into armed conflict in December 1989 leading to 
the collapse of the central government. There was intermission in the war from 1997 
to 1999 when one of many peace agreements overseen by ECOWAS – the Abuja II 
Agreement of 1996 – eventually produced a short and tenuous transition and a 
subsequent election that propelled Charles Taylor to power in a landslide victory in 
1997. Taylor’s continuation of the cycle of conflict through repression of opposition 
and exclusionary practices reignited the war in 1999. Two new armed groups – 
Liberians United for Reconstruction and Development (LURD) and Model for 
Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) – waged war against Taylor’ government. A 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2003 began a period of transition 
in Liberia from which several lessons can be drawn as discussed below.  
 
South Sudan’s trajectory is different from Liberia’s notwithstanding some 
commonalities in their transitions.  South Sudan became a brand new state after 
separating from Sudan in 2011 following decades of civil war. But it descended into 
armed conflict in December 2013. The failure to deal with fault lines in South Sudan 
is one of the factors at the root of this crisis. There is no history of nationhood and no 
previous attempt prior to independence to forge a common destiny among the peoples 
of South Sudan. As such, the South was not a united entity. South Sudanese have 
fought many inter-tribal wars from their internal conflict apart from the conflict with 
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the North (Johnson 2003). Indeed, prior to independence the argument was made that 
little united South Sudanese outside their war with the North (Martin 2002; Young 
2003). Nonetheless, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 was 
expected to begin a period of transition toward peace and reconciliation. 
 
It is in the post-war transitions in both countries that we begin to see several 
similarities and to draw some common lessons. Both countries experienced transitions 
that were products of peace settlements. External actors with particular values and 
track records led the peace processes in both cases. Liberia was first a region-led 
process (by ECOWAS) during the first war between 1990 and 1997 (see Adebajo 
2002; Vogt 1992; Olonisakin 2000) while the CPA of 2003 and the subsequent 
transition was UN-led. The negotiations leading to the CPA on South Sudan was led 
by a regional organisation, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
albeit with participation of a number of key states (Norway, UK and US). The UN 
became actively engaged in the transition that followed including implementation of 
the CPA, the Referendum and post-separation state building.  
  
The settlements – embodied in the CPAs – defined future priorities for the two war- 
affected societies. The post-conflict vision contained security and institution building 
as crucial elements. Since 2003, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has provided 
safety and security as well as support for institution building, beginning with support 
for national elections in 2005. UNMIL remains in Liberia as at 2015, having 
supported a second election (in 2011) and a range of institution building processes 
including among others, justice, rule of law and security sector reform. While 
reconciliation and justice occupied attention of the transitional process in Liberia – in 
recognition of the long history of social exclusion and injustices that gave rise to the 
two wars – this was not a key consideration in Sudan. The 2005 CPA on South Sudan 
gave the people of South Sudan a choice to decide their own future after six years. 
Although the CPA prioritised the unity of Sudan, it provided the option for separation 
should South Sudanese so decide (Thomas 2015). From 2005 to 2011 power was 
shared between Khartoum and Juba. The UN Mission in Sudan was deployed to 
prevent resumption of hostilities and to oversee implementation of the CPA (UNSC 
2005).  
 
In both conflict situations, early elections were not an exit point for the international 
community as in several other post-Cold War interventions. Rather, early elections 
served as an important benchmark for claiming success for the peacemaking effort. 
This proved to be fatally flawed in South Sudan. In Liberia, it has been possible to 
continue to selectively deal with factors at the root of the conflict within the 
framework of the peace arranged by the international community. Age-old settler 
versus indigenous issues of exclusion were locked away although it has been more 
difficult to ignore the problems of inequality not least that posed by youth 
vulnerability and exclusion (Jaye 2007) in a post-war context. The outbreak of Ebola 
and resultant crisis further revealed the scale of inequality in Liberia. However, the 
post-conflict transition has continued without a threat of violent relapse. The 
transition to stable peace has been long but steady but might have been slowed down 
by the Ebola crisis. Ellen-Sirleaf Johnson’s government continues to rely on the 
presence of UNMIL to maintain security and stability.  
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Elections in South Sudan in 2010 and referendum in 2011 did not lead to a stable 
transition but a lapse into armed conflict. Elections held in 2010 gave SPLM an 
overwhelming majority in the South Sudanese parliament. In the referendum held in 
2011 the people of South Sudan voted overwhelmingly in favour of separation from 
Sudan. The Chair of Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), Salva Kiir, 
became the first President of the newly independent country and his deputy in the 
Party, Riek Machar, became Vice president. In order to ensure the security of the new 
state and to help it build peace, state institutions and capacity, the UN deployed the 
UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, UNMISS, with a hybrid mandate of 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding (UNSC 2011).  
 
None of these efforts – CPA, elections, referendum and the UN’s state building 
support – delivered stable peace for South Sudan. The armed conflict that began in 
December 2013 was triggered by a power struggle between the President and vice-
President, which created a crisis within SPLM. It quickly escalated into violence and 
a society polarised along tribal lines (Zink 2014). In hindsight, it is possible to 
attribute this disastrous outcome to a combination of factors related to the transition 
plan. The lack of collective sense of nationhood was overlooked in the CPA. The 
CPA failed to envisage a plan for the post-referendum period in case of a YES vote 
for separation from the North. And in the period after independence, little attention 
was paid to building a national vision. There was no effective effort to integrate the 
Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) with the militia that were loosely 
amalgamated to form a national army. In the absence of the integration of these 
disparate militia groups, soldiers remained loyal to their commanders. Furthermore, 
the SPLM was not effectively transformed into a political party. It remained in its 
liberation mode and continued to be tightly linked to its military wing, SPLA.  
 
Issues of leadership were evident and indeed critical to stability but were not 
systematically treated in the peace agreements and the transitions in the two situations 
discussed here. The person and position perspectives to leadership were obvious in 
the considerations of peacemakers and subsequent peacebuilding arrangements. The 
settlements did not consciously frame an alternative approach to leadership. Both 
settlements were leader centric. They were about making peace between, if not 
pacifying warring elite. The first peace settlement in Liberia arranged by ECOWAS in 
1996 was clearly an “elite peace”. Fatigued and war weary ECOWAS peacemakers 
after seven years of war and twelve (mostly failed) peace agreements, succumbed to 
the whims of the dominant warlord, Charles Taylor. They seemed persuaded that 
permitting Taylor’s rise to power would secure peace, albeit negative peace. Taylor 
campaigned in clear knowledge of this. Out of fear of a return to war Liberians 
elected Taylor as President of Liberia in 1997 (Olonisakin 2000). But war returned 
two years later.  
 
In the transition that followed Liberia’s last peace settlement in 2003, there was 
greater effort to broaden the participation with outreach to civil society but it was still 
very much an elite peace. Indeed the women’s movement led by Leymah Gbowie and 
her colleagues, achieved its mark of distinction precisely because their protests 
compelled Liberia’s feuding elite to shift attention from their narrow and selfish 
interests to larger issues of concern to wider society. It was for the courage of these 
women to bring their leaders to the peace table that Leymah Gbowie earned a Nobel 
Prize. In the ensuing transition in Liberia, it was the key elite including, for example, 
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the leaders of LURD and MODEL that held key posts in the transitional government 
with a sprinkling of former civil society leaders overseeing key tasks. Prominent civil 
society leaders headed the Ministries of Gender and Youth, for example.  
 
However, the overwhelming focus and support of the international community was on 
an individual leader, Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson, who presided over the transitional 
government and won the two elections that followed. Taylor’s indictment by the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and subsequent exile in Nigeria paved the way for 
a stable transition. Unlike the notorious Charles Taylor, Sirleaf-Johnson is well 
known to the international community and received much international support and 
goodwill from the start. Observers of Liberia have at times inferred that the relatively 
long duration of UNMIL is in part due to the Liberia’s President’s plea to the 
international community not to withdraw the Mission. Sirleaf-Johnson is no stranger 
to the United Nations system having previously served as UNDP Assistant 
Administrator with the rank of Assistant Secretary-General. Arguably, she is an ideal 
candidate to support the state building model in place for Liberia. Besides, this 
template seems well suited to the context of Liberia, which for more than one century 
sought to mirror US liberal democratic governance model. While the extent to which 
overwhelming reliance on one leader to secure lasting peace is questionable, it seems 
certain that Liberia will continue to search for stable peace within this framework. Its 
one hundred and forty-two year history of attempted state building prior to the civil 
war cannot be discounted.    
 
South Sudan’s settlement and transition was also about individual leaders but this had 
disastrous consequences for the society in a context in which a sense of nation or a 
semblance of national identity was virtually non-existent. In negotiating the CPA 
overwhelming attention was focused on the leaders of the SPLM who had waged 
decades of war with the North. Little or no attention was paid to the wider society in 
South Sudan and the terms on which they might live together as a nation 
notwithstanding the history of inter-tribal wars. The SPLM’s late leader John Garang, 
was for a long time the face of South Sudan around whom peace negotiations were 
focused. Following his tragic death, his comrades Salva Kiir and Reik Machar 
became the focus of the negotiations. Neither the CPA nor the peacebuilding effort 
developed an agenda for steering South Sudan’s leaders and the populations they 
would preside over toward a common national vision. Indeed, leaders of independent 
South Sudan as well as their supporters focused more on the conflict with the North 
and as such did not craft a common national vision through which to manage 
society’s attention. Focusing on building state institutions in the absence of a common 
vision of the future invariably produced hollow institutions that served a narrow 
group.  
 
The experience of South Sudan thus demonstrates how a narrow perspective to 
leadership not least in the absence of credible and viable institutions of governance 
can facilitate violent relapse. The question then arises, as to what else peace and 
transition planners could and should have done in order to shift their leadership 
perspective in responding to the situation in South Sudan. A conscious leadership 
approach would have meant reordering the transition to focus on facilitating a 
common vision of the future not just among the wartime elite but between them and a 
vast cross-section of South Sudanese. That would have required looking beyond the 
referendum, which was no doubt one element of building a common vision. But rather 
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than electing South Sudan’s future leaders before the referendum, the latter should 
have been the starting point.  
 
The fear that warring elite would return to armed conflict tends to drive peacemakers’ 
focus on feuding elite to the detriment of other potentially viable paths to peace. In 
South Sudan, rather than early elections, which resulted in a placation of war leaders, 
a referendum could have been followed by other priority-setting debates between 
South Sudanese leaders and their wider society as part of the transition. Issues such as 
the constitution and related governance arrangements as well as a national 
development plan, for example, could have been the subjects of further referenda 
before elections were conducted to decide who would lead the new state. All of these 
might have further built a sense of a common purpose among South Sudanese. As 
such, if left to the latter stages of the transition, the focus of South Sudanese people 
when electing their future leaders, would have been on who was best placed to deliver 
agreed national priorities. But by framing the peace around war leaders from the start, 
it became difficult to shift the debate to include the wider society. The clout and 
leveraged exercised by influential outside is about the only instrument that could re-
order peace processes along these lines.  
   
While Liberia and South Sudan now sit at different places on the war-to-peace 
trajectory – Liberia seemingly on the cusp of transition to stability and South Sudan 
rotating in violent relapse – two threads connect their experiences. One is the 
overwhelming focus on building consensus among power elite rather than forging a 
sense of common destiny between these elite and the larger society. The absence of 
leadership building albeit in varying degrees defines the transitions in the two 
countries. The other, which is also far more evident in South Sudan, is that underlying 
issues that kept populations and their leaders divided remained unresolved in the 
transitions. The layers of inequalities persist in Liberia even if masked by a relatively 
stable transition. The conflict relapse in South Sudan might be a moment of 






War-to-peace transitions are about leadership building and about building viable and 
effective institutions that reflect the desired future of the target societies. The 
challenge in Africa is that the leadership perspective adopted by those framing peace 
for war-affected societies bears little relevance to the realities of the context. 
Similarly, the formula for building viable institutions tends to ignore the history and 
peculiarities of the context. Thus, the recipe for conflict relapse is produced right from 
transition planning. Transition planning very often offers a picture of transition and 
the potential for stability. It reveals the nature of the settlement; the extent to which 
issues that led to war are revisited; the vision of the future constructed and the degree 
to which this construction of the future represents the collective will of society.  
 
Process-based leadership and a common vision of a future are thus central to 
successful war-to-peace transitions. There is need for transformation in the way peace 
planners, frame leadership. Rather than focus on individual leaders as an entry point 
for building and sustaining peace, a process-based approach, which facilitates the 
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pursuit of a common destiny among leaders and their society offers a better chance 
for stable peace in countries with limited histories of nation building. Experience in 
transitions across Africa reveal a dearth of this approach to leadership; and an absence 
of a critical interrogation of the trajectory of African states in the process of 
producing a state building framework that is relevant to the context. The brief 
narratives of peacebuilding experiences of Liberia and South Sudan presented in this 
chapter make the point that contexts differ. Every war-affected society has its own 
state making and nation-building trajectory and will not respond in the same way to a 
generic template for building peace. The role of leadership building in these contexts 
is to help society forge a sense of common destiny and nationhood with members who 
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